

Nuevas Tecnologías de Ciberseguridad y Analítica de Datos para Subestaciones Eléctricas

SecureGrid

New generation of electronic equipment to build a more secure power grid

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Project supported by the Department of Economic Development and Infrastructure of the Basque Government (HAZITEK Programme) and the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF).



Digitalisation is increasing vulnerability in the grid


- The number of external connection attempts has increased in the last years
- Regulation is confused
- The measures applied in other sectors are not directly applicable:
 - Availability versus confidentiality. We can not disconnect a system when we suspect an attack.
 - Response times.
 - Geographic and equipment dispersion





- Funded by the Basque Government
- HAZITEK Programme (2016-2018)
- Budget: ~ 4M€
- Develop technology to Increase the security of the IEDs in electrical substations.
- Positioning the Basque Country as an international reference in cybersecurity for Smart Grids.






Regulation

- Which regulation should I apply?
 - IEC 62443. Evaluation of the safety of systems and equipment.
 - IEEE 1686. Security model for IEDs.
- How to apply it?
 - IEC 62351 (IEC 60870, IEC 61850)
 - Part 3 - IEC 60870-5-104
 - Part 4 to 6 - IEC 61850
 - Part 8 - RBAC
 - Part 10 – Architecture
- How to certify it?
 - Testbook of the IEEE 1686

SecureGrid Model – Specification IEEE 1686				
High (A)	5.4.x – Communication encryption 5.5.x – Firmware signing	5.4.x – Communication encryption 5.5.x – Firmware signing	5.5.x – Role management in the config SW 5.5.x – Firmware signing	5.4.x – Communication encryption
Medium (B)	5.1.x – Role management 5.5.x – Role management in the config SW	5.1.x – Role management 5.5.x – Role management in the config SW	5.3.x – Events and alarms monitoring 5.6 – Port activation and deactivation	5.1.x – Role management 5.2.x – Audit record 5.3.x – Events and alarms monitoring 5.5.x – Role management in the config SW
Low (C)	5.1.x – Access control to IED 5.5.4 – Access control to config SW	5.1.x – Access control to IED 5.3.x – Events and alarms monitoring 5.5.4 – Access control to config SW	5.1.x – Role management 5.2.x – Audit record	5.1.x – Access control to IED 5.5.4 – Access control to config SW
Level Req.	Confidentiality	Integrity	Availability	Non-repudiation

Roadmap



Improvements to the equipment

IEEE 1686

- Today, the equipment incorporate:
 - improved generation and management of passwords.
 - disconnection after a period of inactivity
 - role-based access systems
 - generation and management of an audit record containing basic information on events and alarms related to the security of the equipment
- Ongoing work:
 - monitoring of the activity related to security aspects
 - encryption of communications,
 - signature of the firmware and authentication of the configuration software
 - activation and deactivation of communication ports

Clauses 5.x.1

Clauses 5.x.2


Clauses 5.x.3

Clauses 5.x.4

Clauses 5.x.5

Clauses 5.6

Current situation - november 2018



Ethical hacking toolbox

- Allows to perform a set of penetration tests to discover the vulnerabilities that the device presents:
 - Discovery of the services offered by the device.
 - Obtaining the credentials of the services.
 - Denial of Service
- Integrated tools:
 - Nmap
 - Metasploit
 - W3af
 - Ettercap
 - Slowloris



```
root@kali:~/CyberSE# ./sghtb.sh -h
sghtb.sh (OPTION)...


SecureGrid Hacking ToolBox.

Opciones:
-h, --help           Menú de ayuda
-b, --brute_force    Módulos de fuerza bruta.
-s, --scan           Escaneo rápido
-cs, --comprehensive_scan  Escaneo detallado
-sn, --sniffing      Sniffing de credenciales
-f, --firewall       Herramienta de detección de fire
-hd, --hidden_directories  Herramienta que busca directo
-d, --dos            Módulos DoS

Módulos de fuerza bruta:
--ftp               Fuerza bruta FTP
--ssh               Fuerza bruta SSH
--telnet            Fuerza bruta telnet
--http_apache       Fuerza bruta al logIn HTTP de apache
--all               Todos

Módulos de DoS:
--normal            Ataque normal de DoS
--slowloris         Ataque tipo slowloris de DoS

root@kali:~/CyberSE#
```



Conclusions

- Manufacturers are immersed in a process to improve the security of electrical equipment:
 - Make it more difficult to take control of the equipment from an external system, and avoid spreading to other equipment.
 - Registration of actions related to security.
 - Encrypted and signed communications.
 - Strengthen the equipment availability.
- Added value of collaboration between competitors.
- Ethical hacking as a tool applied to the improvement of security of IEDs during the manufacturing process.
- It is essential to combine the measures developed in the project (OT) with improved IT security measures.

There is still a lot to do...!

- Share and check the project results with utilities.
- Definition of technological lines for the project to evolve
 - Recovery from attacks
 - Honeypots
- Adaptation of electronic equipment to the evolution of regulation, which increasingly includes more security aspects.
- TecNALIA has a Cybersecurity Laboratory for Smart Grid:
 - It is part of the Cybersecurity Node of the "Digital Innovation Hub" of Advanced Manufacturing in the Basque Country.
 - It allows the simulation of new (and more complex) attack scenarios, as well as testing new equipment and attack detection systems.

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Thank you!

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<http://www.clusterenergia.com/securegrid>

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